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ACQUISITION INTEGRATION FLEXIBILITY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Conducting acquisitions constitutes an established strategy in dynamic markets (Zajac et al., 
2000; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Heeley et al., 2006). Acquisitions can both initiate and 
adjust to change in a firm’s competitive environment (Keil et al., 2013; Haleblian et al., 2012) 
by providing an acquirer with access to new competencies or markets faster and at a lower 
cost than organic growth (Capron, 1999; Lee & Lieberman, 2010; Makri et al., 2010; Calipha 
et al., 2018). Still, acquisitions often fail to produce value to shareholders (King et al., 2004), 
or even destroy value (Moeller et al., 2005), and acquiring firm shareholders typically 
experience losses (Andrade et al., 2001). While research suggests that extracting the full 
benefits of an acquisition generally requires careful planning for organizational integration 
between the involved firms (Brueller et al., 2017; Graebner et al., 2017; Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991; Lubatkin et al., 1998; Steigenberger, 2017), theory remains incomplete with 
how firms manage unpredicted events during integration.  
While the difficulty of fully predicting events is foundational to integration research 
(Jemison and Sitkin, 1986), research has emphasized the benefits of integration planning to 
better foresee, avoid, and master integration challenges (Ahammad and Glaister, 2013). 
Arguably, the focus on planning has come at the expense of theorizing on how to manage 
inevitable adjustments during integration. For example, research shows that internal employee 
anxiety and stress evolve in ways difficult to predict (Schweiger and DeNisi, 1991; Dackert et 
al., 2003). Further, integration can lead to tensions between cultures that are inherently hard 
to decipher (Stahl and Voigt, 2008) and give rise to hard to predict in-group and out-group 
biases associated with political behavior (Jetten et al., 2002; van Leeuwen et al., 2003). At the 
same time, external dynamism involves efforts intended to surprise acquirers including 
competitive reactions (King and Schriber, 2016), including unexpected losses of customers 

































































(Anderson et al., 2001; Öberg et al., 2007; Rogan and Greve, 2014) and employees (Brown et 
al., 2003), or both (Kato and Schoenberg, 2014). Further, integration takes several years to 
complete, making initial planning increasingly difficult and demanding of managerial 
attention at the expense of consideration of the external environment (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; 
Cording, Christmann and King, 2008; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Alongside the ability to 
foresee events, we propose the ability to adjust to unforeseen events during integration is an 
underappreciated explanation in research for acquisition performance.  
In light of the limited structured attention to how firms detect and mitigate the effects 
of dynamism during integration on acquisition performance, we develop the role of 
integration flexibility as a mediator of acquisition performance and demonstrate how this 
capability varies across firms. We build our framework on a dynamic capabilities perspective 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and acquisition research with an emphasis on the role of 
managers at various hierarchical levels (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Cording et al., 2008). 
Our basic argument is consistent with the realization that managers display bounded 
rationality (Cyert and March, 1963; Birkinshaw et al., 2000), and recognition that the impact 
of dynamism is mediated by organizational flexibility (cf. Hedberg et al., 1976; Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2009). We expect integration flexibility develops gradually and depends on an 
acquirer’s organizational characteristics, deal characteristics, and the nature of internal and 
external change during integration.  
Multiple contributions result from the paper. First, we develop the concept of 
integration flexibility. Specifically, we build on and extend related research (e.g., Junni et al., 
2015) to develop this concept as an organization’s ability to make appropriate adjustments to 
ongoing integration in relation to changing conditions. Second, we relate our observations to 
different acquisition phases or times managers and organizations can develop, assess, and 
apply integration flexibility. This implies an ability to adapt acquisition integration to 

































































dynamic conditions requires a process perspective (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Steigenberger, 
2017). Third, our study adds a dimension to typical research considerations focused on the 
planning stage to consider implementation. As a result, our study emphasizes the need in 
acquisition research to also pay attention to acquirer capabilities for integration. Fourth, our 
paper strengthens the tie between dynamic capability and acquisition research. Specifically, 
prior research has established capabilities allow important variation in routine behavior 
(Heimeriks et al., 2012), and we elaborate the role of flexibility in variation. In the following 
sections, we develop a framework and related propositions for characteristics associated with 
integration flexibility.  
Benefits from Integration Flexibility 
Research has emphasized the complexity of acquisitions and that it is very difficult to 
predict integration (Vester, 2002), and we propose integration flexibility constitutes an 
important yet underestimated organizational capability. Generally, organizational flexibility 
involves the ability to adjust an organization to novel circumstances, involving the 
development of alternative strategies and attending to external change for maintaining 
strategic fit of an organization with its environment (Brozovic, 2018). In the context of 
acquisitions, we define integration flexibility as the capability to adapt planned and ongoing 
integration efforts to new conditions. Adaptation includes reducing or increasing the degree of 
integration, or shifting the aim of integration to benefit from other value sources than initially 
planned. The associated capability is largely tied to managers along the hierarchy who 
initiate, control, and adjust integration in both acquirer and target (Graebner, 2004; Cording et 
al., 2008; Lamont et al., 2018), and this likely impacts acquisition performance in several 
associated ways.  
First, in acquisitions, synergy potential relates to increased competitiveness from 
integration between the involved firms, but anticipated synergies can disappear because of 

































































contextual change (Rouzies et al., 2018). Without adjustment, integration likely suffers for 
several reasons. First, integration creates costs and, if not matched with associated benefits, 
performance will fall. Second, insufficiently adjusted integration will leave potential value 
unrealized when conditions and synergies shift. Third, continued implementation of initial 
plans rendered obsolete by change will lead to reduced rather than improved performance. For 
example, the pursuit of cost reductions can leave an organization unable to cope with novel 
environmental conditions (Shaver, 2006).  
Our starting point is that important drivers of acquisition flexibility are already 
discussed in acquisition research; however, they have not yet been combined in a discussion 
about how acquiring firms are able to adjust to unexpected events. Rather than evolving in a 
haphazard way, we argue that important variables from acquisition research can be structured 
logically to explain integration flexibility. Research generally agrees acquisitions evolve 
depending the acquirer, the target, and the integration process (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991; Bauer and Matzler, 2014), and we argue acquirer and target firm characteristics and 
integration management connects the most important factors addressed so far in acquisition 
research contributing to integration flexibility. 
Therefore, we discuss three key factors taking center stage in acquisition research that 
combine and contribute to integration flexibility. First, integration flexibility depends on 
acquiring firm characteristics (Wright and Snell, 1998) that develop path-dependently and 
influenced by managerial choices and the situations to which the firm is exposed. Second, the 
effect of integration flexibility is affected by the context. Research consistently demonstrates 
a variety of contingencies affect acquisition performance, including the amount of acquirer-
target similarity (relatedness) as a determinant of integration (e.g., Capron, 1999) and relative 
size (e.g., Graebner, 2004). As a result, we argue that deal characteristics modify the impact 
of integration flexibility. Third, integration research places great emphasis on the role of 

































































integration management (Cording et al., 2008), and the ability for integration flexibility 
associated with the resources applied to manage the integration process. Overall, the 
antecedents to integration flexibility explain the ability of acquiring firms to adjust ongoing 
integration processes that we develop in more detail below.  
Acquirer Characteristics 
The ability of acquiring firms to adjust ongoing integration processes following an acquisition 
is contingent on prior decisions and experiences. The ability to adjust to unexpected events is 
recognized especially in the dynamic capabilities perspective (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
1997) as a means of explaining firm performance in environments of varying degrees of 
dynamism (Danneels, 2011) including acquisitions (Heimeriks et al., 2012). Although this 
broad research spans various approaches, we join the view that dynamic capabilities consist of 
collective, skill-based and purposeful organizational efforts of various complexity, repetition 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and managerial intervention (Teece, 2012). Importantly, while 
distinct from luck (Winter, 2003), capabilities allow firms to “vary in how well they can 
perform an activity” (Helfat and Winter, 2011: 1244). It is the aim of capabilities research to 
identify what constitutes strategically important capabilities. In the context of knowledge 
transfer in acquisitions, Junni and colleagues (2015) propose sensing, resource fluidity, and 
collective commitment support this ability, and we argue this extends integration more 
broadly. In the following subsections, we develop how acquisition rese rch provides several 
arguments overlapping with dynamic capabilities and integration flexibility.  
Acquisition Experience. Acquisition experience contributes to an organizational ability 
that provides a portfolio of responses to circumstances that recognizes changing conditions 
and adapts initial plans. Research supports that acquisition experience enables drawing 
conclusions from prior deals to improve performance of subsequent transactions (Zollo and 
Singh, 2004). For example, experience can attenuate negative effects of superstitious learning 

































































(Zollo, 2009) to enable developing a variety of potential solutions (Haunschild and Sullivan, 
2002). However, research also points to the risk of misapplying prior, similar experiences in 
new contexts (Ellis et al., 2011; Heimeriks et al., 2012). In other words, firms with too narrow 
experience may display lower performance in subsequent acquisitions. Simply, this ability is 
more likely in organizations with relevant experience in acquisition integration, as 
experienced acquirers can extract, accumulate, and create knowledge (Echajari and Thomas, 
2015). Thus, we propose:  
Proposition 1: Broader acquisition experience is positively associated with integration 
flexibility.  
 
Resource slack. Organizational change typically requires preparation and costly 
alterations alongside ongoing operations that make slack important to flexibility. Slack 
compromises human, financial, or other resources not fully utilized in the daily operations of 
a firm that are associated with adaptation (Bourgeois, 1981; Singh, 1986). Research suggests 
that slack enables absorbing adjustment to internal and external change (Chattopadhyay et al., 
2001; Damanpour, 1991). As a result, slack enables pursuing new, untested activities that are 
associated with adjusting to change (Danneels, 2002). This is consistent with slack being 
beneficial during disruptions (Wan and Yiu, 2009), and acquisitions are disruptive. 
Integration is also costly and greater slack available places fewer restrictions on adjusting 
integration plans. Shaver (2006) elaborates this point eloquently by arguing that acquisitions 
pursuing strict cost reduction risk reducing slack to make a firm vulnerable to sudden 
environmental shifts. As a result, we propose:  
Proposition 2: Slack resources (e.g., financial) are positively associated with 
integration flexibility.  
Middle Manager Involvement. The degree to which decision-making is centralized or 
dispersed differs between firms, and we posit this is related to integration flexibility. The 
formal and informal organizational impact on decision-making in firms is recognized both 

































































generally and in relation to dynamic capabilities to relate to their ability to adjust to external 
dynamism (Danneels, 2011; Kay, 2010), and we argue this in turn sets important boundaries 
for integration flexibility. While the role of middle managers is largely unexamined in 
acquisition research (Meglio and Risberg, 2010), it is recognized that middle managers face 
difficult circumstances during an acquisition (Meyer and Altenborg, 2008) at the same time 
they are critical to its success (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Middle managers are closer to 
the challenges facing an organization and display less lock-in, but they also often have less 
authority to direct change (Nohria and Berkley, 1994; Sayles and Stewart, 1995). The more 
responsibility and authority a firm delegates to middle management the faster the firm can 
react and implement change (King et al., 2001; Stensaker et al., 2008). This suggests that 
greater middle management involvement can make a firm more flexible, and we propose:  
Proposition 3: More middle management involvement in an acquiring firm is 
positively associated with integration flexibility. 
Acquirer Dynamism Experience. Firm experience shapes the capabilities that develop, 
and firms in some industries face conditions more favorable for developing skills related to 
flexibility. While some sources of external dynamism are common to several markets, such as 
financial crises, other sources differ between industries. For instance, immature and 
fragmented markets often lack product standards and greater rivalry (Porter, 1980). Firms in 
such industries are more likely to experience dynamism associated with conditions needed to 
develop routines for managing change (Helfat and Peteraf, 2009). Therefore, firms operating 
in a dynamic industry is more likely to have managers with relevant experience in how to 
adapt to changing conditions. As a result, firms in dynamic industries will likely be able to 
extend their experience to change integration plans, when compared to managers from stable 
or more mature industries (cf. Spender, 1989). This is important since the success of 
alterations in integration plans likely depends on the inherent responsiveness of an acquiring 

































































firm (Volberda, 1996). Further, firms unable to adjust to environmental dynamism are likely 
to be outcompeted making remaining firms more likely to possess flexibility to accommodate 
industry dynamism. Therefore, we propose: 
Proposition 4: Acquiring firm experience of industry dynamism is positively 
associated with integration flexibility. 
 
Deal Ch racteristics 
Research is consistent in pointing to the combination between acquirer and target as central to 
explain how acquisitions evolve. Often described in terms of ‘fit’, how the target relates to the 
acquirer sets important conditions for value potentials (Bauer and Matzler, 2014). While not 
acknowledged as such, we argue that several factors found in prior research also have 
important implications for integration flexibility. Put differently, the same acquirer can 
experience very different levels of flexibility in relation to two different targets. Put 
differently, acquisitions differ, and target firms contextualize and modify available integration 
flexibility.  
Target Firm Size. While there is a risk that smaller targets are neglected (Calipha et al, 
2010), smaller targets are more easily integrated (Cording et al., 2008). Given a similar level 
of integration, a larger target will require more effort to integrate (Pablo, 1994) as size 
correlates with increased rigidity and inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). For example, the 
number of contacts that are possible between separately identifiable units grows exponentially 
as size increases linearly. The larger the total number of connections necessary for a desired 
level of integration drives greater disruption to the operations of both firms. Additionally, 
larger peer-groups of target and acquirer employees might trigger conflict (Homburg and 
Bucerius, 2006). Further, firm size affects legal constraints, as government oversight and 
regulations, such as employee protection increase with firm size. Overall, larger targets will 
receive more managerial attention than the smaller counterparts (Slangen, 2006), and we 
propose:  

































































Proposition 5: A target firm’s size lowers acquirer integration flexibility.  
 
Degree of integration. The degree of relatedness between an acquiring and target firm 
influences the degree of integration with related acquisitions typically requiring greater 
integration (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994). We argue that the lower the 
intended integration level, the higher the integration flexibility. Primarily, less integration 
requires lower resource commitment, including managerial and financial resources. Greater 
integration contributes to managers having an internal focus that reduces perception of 
external cues (Cording et al., 2008) that can signal a need to adjust integration. Additionally, 
greater integration between combining firms increases the costs of reversing decisions and 
organizational links. As a result, greater integration carries a higher cost to respond to 
dynamic change, and we propose:  
Proposition 6: Lower levels of integration positively influence integration flexibility.  
 
Physical Distance. Geographic distance has a persistent effect in selecting acquisition 
targets, and one explanation is the amount of information needed for integration is easier for 
more proximate target firms (Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 2013; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). 
Greater distance also increases the opportunity for misunderstanding due to regional, cultural 
or institutional differences (Ahammad et al., 2016). For example, one of the rules applied by 
Cisco, an active acquirer, involves selecting geographically close targets, as Cisco’s CEO is 
attributed to having the attitude that he did not want to have to board a plane to solve 
problems with an acquisition (Bunnell, 2000: 68). This argument is strengthened in cases 
where distance involves cultural or national borders (Bauer et al., 2018; Kling et al., 2014). 
Less physical distance between an acquirer and target also facilitate knowledge flow from 
increased interaction between employees (Rosenkopf and Almedia, 2003), while increased 
distance is associated with higher transaction costs (McCarthy and Aalbers, 2016). Greater 
communication and face-to-face meetings over time are also associated with improved 

































































identification and trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995). The combined effect is that geographic 
proximity increases the amount of interactions, information exchanged and trust between 
combining firm employees that will likely facilitate change during integration. Thus, we 
propose: 
Proposition 7: Greater physical distance between an acquirer and target negatively 
impacts integration flexibility.  
Integration management 
Acquisition research consistently points to the importance of how integration is managed for 
explaining acquisition performance (e.g., Capron, 1999; Cording, et al., 2008). Several 
decisions regarding how integration is managed are distinct from the acquiring firm 
organization and target. Very different acquirers can decide to focus on similar issues, and 
vice versa (Ellis and Lamont, 2004). The implication is that integration processes, or the focus 
of attention and resources are assigned to integration offer important insights into how 
acquisitions evolve. Although integration research covers a wide range of topics, below we 
focus on those most clearly connecting to integration flexibility during integration.  
Environment Scanning. One condition for successful integration flexibility involves 
detecting changes to enable adjustment. Environmental scanning takes effort, as decision-
makers have an uncertain view of their competitive environment (Porac and Thomas 1990) 
and cognitive limitations contribute to routinized behavior (Cyert and March, 1963). 
However, effort offers rewards, as firms that dedicate employees to environmental scanning 
have an increased chance to both detect and correctly interpret environment shifts (Elenkov, 
1997). Still, it is often difficult to maintain environmental scanning during acquisition 
integration.  
The time consuming nature of integration leads managers to focus internally at the 
expense of environmental scanning (Cording et al., 2008). A tendency to focus internally is 

































































likely compounded by managers viewing internal acquisition risks as easier to manage than 
external risks (Elango et al., 2013), contributing to managers overlooking externally driven 
needs to change (Graetz and Smith, 2010). Overall, we anticipate environmental scanning is 
more important during acquisition integration, as integration is among the best of times to 
attack competitors that are otherwise distracted (Meyer, 2008). Therefore, we propose:  
Proposition 8: Environment scanning positively correlates integration flexibility. 
 
Integration Team Diversity. Research suggests that transition teams enable integration 
flexibility (Meglio et al., 2015). One important aspect of integration flexibility involves 
having an integration team with varied expertise. The ability to successfully bring in 
additional resources and adjust plans is contingent on the ability to correctly “read” internal 
and external events and interpret the consequences (Shaver, 2006). The ability to interpret 
complex processes relates to familiarity, and different training and career paths develop 
unique perspectives between organizational functions that influences the salience of 
information (Sorensen, 1999). The implication is that managers with a production background 
tend to emphasize issues relating to production, at the expense of information or cues 
perceived as more relevant to other functions that could be more important to acquisition 
success. During acquisition integration, adaptation depends on different managerial skills and 
experience, including familiarity with a target firm (Graebner, 2004; Krishnan et al., 1997). 
This does not mean a team has needed capacity, but expertise to recognize what is needed and 
when. For example, consultants can provide needed expertise and meet temporary increases in 
demand for specialized personnel (Feldman and Spratt, 1999). Therefore, we propose:  
Proposition 9: An integration team’s diversity positively correlates with integration 
flexibility. 
Management Capacity. Implementing changes during integration increases manager 
workload and absorbs their attention (Kavanagh and Ashkanasy, 2006). Successful acquirers 

































































often maintain additional employees than expected for a final end state to avoid a negative 
impact on operations (Meyer, 2008). Research recognizes that acquisitions limit the ability of 
managers to coordinate diverse activities (Zhou, 2011), and, when overwhelmed by demands, 
managers likely go with what they know leading to locally rational decision making that 
negatively effects overall performance (Laamanen and Keil, 2008). Acquisition integration 
requires non-routine decisions and limited information that drives managerial sensemaking at 
the same time managers provide guidance to employees (e.g., Maitlis, 2005). A firm’s ability 
to engage employees likely depends on managers being able to address increased demands 
during integration. Overall, greater management capacity will ease integration by enabling 
flexibility in its implementation, so we propose:  
Proposition 10: Managerial capacity positively correlates with integration flexibility. 
 
Integration Speed. Speed is an important consideration for acquisition integration 
(Bauer and Matzler, 2014; Cording et al., 2008; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Research 
generally advises faster integration to reduce employee uncertainty, give competitors less time 
to respond, and realize performance improvement faster (Angwin, 2004; Homburg and 
Bucerius, 2006). However, integration decisions once made can be difficult to reverse 
(Leiblein et al., 2002), and research recognizes that integrating a target firm too fast risks 
destroying value (Angwin, 2004). For example, Uzelac and colleagues (2016) find that 
intuitive decision making combined with fast human integration reduces acquisition 
performance, and this may be partially attributed to increased turmoil. Additionally, the 
complexity of acquisition integration often drives active experimentation to achieve goals 
(Vester, 2002), and it is reasonable to expect this takes time. Therefore, we propose:  
Proposition 11: Faster integration is negatively associated with integration flexibility. 
Acquisition Performance 

































































While the benefits of integration flexibility likely remain insignificant in completely 
predictable or stable integration processes, we anticipate a positive impact under dynamic 
conditions. Primarily, strategic complexity makes planning difficult at the same time that it 
increases the need for planning (Kukalis, 1989). Acquisition integration is among the most 
complex activities managers face, and the primary benefit of having an initial integration plan 
is that it identifies what is important and provides a basis for adjustment. For example, initial 
analysis will make assumptions about acquisition integration with respect to competitor 
reactions, employee turnover, and other metrics that can be observed and significant 
deviations from expectations lead to the need to react (cf. Gates and Very, 2003; King and 
Schriber, 2016).  
A related reason is that the process of implementation often focuses on additional 
planning (Stensaker et al., 2008). The amount of information known about a target firm will 
be limited during due diligence when initial integration plans are formed by an acquiring 
firm’s managers. The increased interaction between acquiring and target firm managers will 
lead to the exchange of additional information that can lead to unexpected gains (Graebner, 
2004). A positive impact of integration flexibility also relates to explicit plans limiting 
managerial options for reaching desired goals (Eisenberg and Witten, 1987), or it leaves 
ambiguity (Risberg, 2003). The combined implication is that integration flexibility can be an 
important part of integration planning, and the impact will be larger when dynamism is high. 
Therefore, we propose:  
Proposition 12: The positive impact from integration flexibility on acquisition 
performance is contingent on the level of internal and external dynamism a firm faces.  
Discussion 
While acquisitions help firms adjust to market dynamism and changing conditions 
(Almor et al., 2014), research largely assumes a stable environment for integration. However, 

































































integration typically takes several years to complete and we build on research demonstrating 
convincingly such changes are difficult to predict. As a result, we meet a need to develop how 
firms maintain flexibility during acquisition integration. Consistent with a dynamic 
capabilities perspective, we develop factors that influence a capability for integration 
flexibility and its subsequent influence on acquisition performance. As a result, integration 
flexibility represents an important organizational ability that enables altering integration plans 
to achieve positive outcomes. Further, integration flexibility likely varies between firms, and 
this variation begins to explain variance in acquisition performance. We summarize our 
hypotheses in a framework. Figure 1 depicts our view of integration flexibility as an 
organizational ability with its determinants and influence on acquisition performance, and we 
next outline its theoretical and practical implications.  
 
----- Insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
 
Research Implications 
We complement a planning perspective in acquisition research to show that integration 
flexibility can result in improved acquisition performance. Research has established the 
importance of target assessment and acquisition planning, and, when planning is insufficient 
or difficult, acquisition performance suffers (Ahammad and Glaister, 2013). More recently, 
attention on the need to attend to uncertainty during integration has grown (e.g., Junni et al., 
2015). We develop and extend this logic by showing that integration flexibility needs to 
accommodate changing conditions that are often difficult or impossible to predict, and we 
outline the factors constituting this capability. This complements prior deal-based planning 
frameworks that emphasizes the need to assess a target firm to initiate relevant integration 
efforts (e.g. Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). A clear implication is that integration flexibility 

































































is likely to affect the variables commonly studied in acquisition research, and it could begin to 
explain inconsistent results in predicting acquisition performance (King et al., 2004). Put 
differently, integration flexibility stands out as a novel explanation for why acquisition 
performance varies.  
Capabilities develop over time, and we outline different organizational factors that 
influence the development of integration flexibility. Specifically, we outline integration 
flexibility across broad categories and times related to acquirer and deal characteristics, and 
integration management. This complements a process perspective of acquisition research 
(Jemison and Sitkin, 1986), and, while acquisition research still often considers these issues 
separately (Bauer and Matzler, 2014), our framework integrates them. This places integration 
flexibility as an intermediate ability in the acquisition process that influences acquisition 
performance (e.g., Cording et al., 2008).  
Our framework adds a dimension to research on target selection that typically stresses 
financial viability and overpayment and benefits of different degrees of relatedness. For 
example, research suggests that acquirers are more likely recognize the benefit of 
combinations in related acquisitions that can be difficult for others to anticipate (cf. Winter, 
2000) compared to acquisitions in unrelated industries (Graebner, 2004). Complementing 
such considerations, our framework provides needed research attention to integration 
flexibility. As this capability can differ between firms and each acquisition modifies the need 
for integration capability, we expand research on pre-acquisition assessment to consider a 
new set of factors necessary for successfully integrating a particular target. These insights 
collectively constitute a step toward new theory that can begin to explain inconsistent 
research findings on acquisition performance (e.g. King et al., 2004), and we attribute 
importance to them since acquisitions tend to occur in periods of industry restructuring where 
unexpected dynamism is typically high (Heeley et al., 2006). 

































































Finally, we strengthen and elaborate a link between research on firm capabilities and 
acquisitions. Prior research has established a firm’s integration capability depends on prior 
experience (Heimeriks et al., 2012), and our framework expands it to consider conditions 
associated with a specific acquisition. This suggests that needed integration flexibility is 
partly contingent on acquiring firm characteristics or that integration capability is not subject 
to short-term planning. As such, integration flexibility is part of the set of capabilities 
acquiring firms can develop over time that have also been shown to impact acquisition 
performance (cf. Laamanen and Keil, 2008). 
Management Implications 
Our framework also has important consequences for acquiring managers. First, acquirers need 
to consider the integration capability, as this influences the likelihood of success. While 
planning integration remains important, our study emphasizes integration flexibility predicts 
acquisition performance in more realistic circumstances than the majority of research that 
assumes stable and predictable integration circumstances. Second, we outline factors that 
acquiring firms can influence to increase integration flexibility at different times of the 
acquisition process. An important implication is this capability depends partly on conditions 
long before a focal transaction. In consequence, we suggest managers not only plan a focal 
acquisition, but they also set aside resources for building integration flexibility needed to 
complete subsequent acquisitions. Lastly, integration flexibility is a capability that influences 
acquisition performance. Put differently, acquiring managers should go beyond financial 
considerations to consider whether available integration flexibility can support acquiring and 
integrating a prospective target.  
Limitations and Future Research 
We acknowledge that our research has multiple limitations. A central boundary condition for 
the relevance of our ideas is that integration flexibility assumes dynamism and uncertainty. 

































































While severely hampered in dynamic environments, traditional integration planning will 
likely be preferable in stable environments. Further, dynamic capabilities are also costly to 
develop and maintain (Winter, 2003), and the costs of integration may outweigh its benefits. 
We also anticipate negative impacts from excess integration flexibility are possible. For 
example, research has identified power games that develop during integration processes 
hinder reaching acquisition goals (Meyer and Altenborg, 2007), and continued adjustment to 
integration may unnecessarily extend integration and forming a common organizational 
identity. As a result, the climate and motivation for adjusting integration plans will be 
important. This study is limited to topics and factors studied in prior acquisition research, 
however, also allows us to point to areas of more research. Ours is a first instep into 
integrating previously fragmented insights into the need and possibilities for adjusting 
integration to unexpected dynamism, flexibility in acquisition integration and associated 
relationships with acquisition performance remain an important avenue for future research. To 
illustrate, we have built on research arguing for more research on external scanning, but also 
internal scanning during integration to detect upcoming challenges should be of value for 
explaining integration flexibility.  
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